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Tunisian protestors in January 2011. Source: Moises Saman, New York Times
Introduction
Beginning with the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, this project critically examines 
recent literature identifying the causes of the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions and 
offers an alternative explanation centering on the political opportunities for 
national-level popular contention presented by these regimes’ centralized and 
decentralized state structures.
Authoritarian Capacity
After the Arab Spring, many commentators have argued that China’s superior 
“capacity” has insulated it from popular challenges where Tunisia and Egypt’s 
did not. This capacity involves:
1. An effective coercive apparatus, capable of silencing and intimidating 
potential opponents, is essential to a regime’s resilience.
As the result of the one child policy, China’s youth bulge has been comparably 
small (45.3% under 30) , whereas Tunisia and Egypt’s (56.1% and 62.7%). 
Variation in unemployment has been less clear. In Tunisia and Egypt, official 
unemployment in 2005 had reached rates of 14.2% and 11.2%.  China’s official 
4.1% is much lower, but other estimates have measured actual unemployment 
in the PRC as high as 14.0% or 20.0%.
Inequality rates in China have recently actually begun to exceed those in the 
Arab world. In 2001, Egypt’s GINI index for the distribution of family inequality 
was reported at 34.4 (90th most unequal of 136 countries), whereas Tunisia’s 
was estimated a 40.0 (61st) in 2005 and China reported 41.5 (52nd) in 2007. 
According to the 2010 Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI), corruption in China 
has paralleled that in Egypt and Tunisia. Pew Forum’s Global Attitudes Project 
(2008) and The China Survey (2008) have indicated that large majorities (78% 
and 67.5%) average citizens consider official corruption to be a serious problem. 
These drivers have contributed to spiraling unrest in China. As reported by the 
Ministry of Public Security, “mass incidents” in the country increased from 
10,000 in 1994 to 87,000 in 2005, with some accounts suggesting the number 
had accelerated to 180,000 by 2010. 
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In recent decades, Tunisia, Egypt and China have all invested heavily in 
mechanisms of media control and internal security forces trained and equipped 
for non-lethal crowd dispersal, enhancing their coercive capacities.
Moreover, the increased diffusion of social media technology has challenged all 
three regimes’ ability to maintain control over information.
2. Discretionary control over the economy, which enables regimes to distribute 
rewards to supporters and starve opponents.
In all three regimes, market reforms over the last several decades have relaxed 
state discretionary control over the economy. 
3. A highly-institutionalized political party helps a regime maintain internal 
cohesion in the face of popular challenges from below.
In an effort to mirror the stability of the Chinese Communist Party and other 
long-lived autocracies, the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes institutionalized their 
regimes by establishing hegemonic ruling parties and using elections to recruit 
emerging elites, manage internal factionalism and distribute rents and offices to 
loyalists. 
Social Drivers of Unrest 
Others have suggested the bottom-up drivers of discontent in Egypt and 
Tunisia: a large youth bulge, socioeconomic inequities, and official corruption 
have made national level popular uprisings more likely than in China. 
2011 Protest against corrupt officials in Wukan, Guangdong. Source: McClatchy News
If variation on measures of capacity and social drivers of unrest is unclear, what 
intervening factors might help explain China’s enduring resilience to nationwide 
unrest and regime breakdown? 
The Missing Variables: Centralization and Modes of Contention
With the limited  variability of between capacity and social driver-based factors 
in in these three cases, why has China not seen regime stabilizing national 
protests similar to the Arab Spring?
The decentralized structure of the Chinese state has opened political 
opportunities for localized collective actions targeted at 
particular, community-specific targets while closing opportunities and the 
demand for coordinated cross-regional collective actions in the mode of the 
Arab Spring.
Fiscal and administrative decentralization: Compared to Tunisia and 
Egypt, where subnational governments respectively controlled 12.1% and 
15.6% of all government expenditures, in China, an average of 54.84% of fiscal 
expenditures were spent at the subnational level from 1995 to 1998.
Coercive decentralization: As noted by Cai (2008) and others, responsibility for 
managing social unrest has been delegated to local officials in China not left to 
centralized internal security forces as seen in Egypt and Tunisia.
By granting local officials greater authority within their jurisdiction to distribute 
resources and manage unrest, the center avoids blame for local authorities’
performance and their use of repression. Consequently,  local officials and 
parochial issues become the  focus of contentious actions, and claimants 
develop repertoires of contention and bases of support that are conducive to 
local and particularized but not national, anti-system modes of action. 
Full references available at: http://bridgeport.academia.edu/SteveHess
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